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GOVERNMENTAL ILLEGITIMACY 
AND NEOCOLONIALISM: 
RESPONSE TO REVIEW BY 
JAMES THUO GATHII 
Brad R. Roth* 
INTRODUCTION 
The essence of James Thuo Gathii's criticism of Governmental 
Illegitimacy in International Law1 is that my study seeks to answer a 
doctrinal question rather than to challenge the "Eurocentric" 
assumptions that pervade doctrinal thinking. Although I (inevitably) 
take exception to some of Professor Gathii's characterizations of the 
book's details, an elaborate clarification and defense of these finer 
points would amount to an uninteresting response to an interesting 
essay. Indeed, since Gathii characterizes the book as "well written, 
well-argued, and well-researched,"2 and since I am in sympathy with 
the considerations that prompt him to go beyond the scope of what I 
sought to accomplish, I am tempted to treat Gathii's essay as a 
complement (as well as, in many respects, a compliment) to my book, 
and therefore to leave well enough alone. 
I nonetheless accept the Michigan Law Review's invitation to re­
spond, in order to confront directly the political challenge that Gathii, 
as a participant in the scholarly current of "critical" approaches to in­
ternational law, poses to my more traditional brand of legal scholar­
ship. Above all, I want to contest the relationship that Gathii posits 
between disciplinary methodology and political substance. 
"Critical" scholars frequently seem to imagine that, in struggling 
against the methodological norms of their disciplines, they are strug­
gling against the very structure of the power relations that exploit and 
repress the poor and weak - the metaphor being, in their minds, 
somehow transubstantiated into reality. The result is, all too often, an 
* Assistant Professor of Legal Studies and Political Science and Adjunct Professor of 
Law, Wayne State University. J.D. 1987, Harvard; LL.M. 1992, Columbia; Ph.D. 1996, Uni­
versity of California, Berkeley. - Ed. I would like to thank Gregory H. Fox, James Kurth, 
Charles Parrish, James Chalmers, and William Curley for their helpful comments. 
1. James Thuo Gathii, Neoliberalism, Colonialism and International Governance: De­
centering the International Law of Governmental Legitimacy, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1996, 2013 
(2000) (reviewing BRAD R. ROTH, GOVERNMENTAL ILLEGmMACY IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (1999)). 
2. Id. at 2004. 
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illusory radicalism, rhetorically colorful but programmatically vacu­
ous. The danger is that a fantasized radicalism will lead scholars to 
abandon the defense of the very devices that give the poor and weak a 
modicum of leverage, when defense of those devices is perhaps the 
only thing of practical value that scholars are in a position to contrib­
ute.3 
My main problem with Gathii's critique, then, is not (as he might 
imagine) that it is political, but that it is politically dysfunctional. 
More specifically, for all of Gathii's anticolonial posturing, my book is, 
I insist, far more effectively anticolonial than is his critique of it. 
I. THE LAW AND POLmCS OF GOVERNMENTAL ILLEGITIMACY 
Professor Gathii is fully justified in subjecting Governmental Ille­
gitimacy in International Law to an essentially political critique, for the 
book, like all legal scholarship, has political implications - in this 
case, designedly so.4 This is not to say, as "critical" scholars sometimes 
seem to imply, that law or legal scholarship is reducible to ordinary 
politics. Law is a purposive project, and thus not exclusively an em­
pirical phenomenon; "law as it is" cannot be wholly separated from 
"law as it ought to be."5 The purposes that drive the project, however, 
must be demonstrably immanent in social reality, not merely superim­
posed according to the predilections of the jurist; the jurist's task, at 
once creative and bounded, is to render a persuasive account of how 
those immanent purposes bind powerful actors to worthy projects 
3. Bruno Simma and Andreas S. Paulus make a version of this point against Hilary 
Charlesworth in a recent Symposium on Method in International Law. Simma and Paulus 
express doubt that the emphasis on subjectivity that marks Charlesworth's feminist approach 
to method: 
will be helpful in the dialogue with decision makers because it does not appear compatible 
with the setting of general standards for human behavior - norms urgently needed to hold 
the perpetrators of crimes against women accountable under the rule of law. The impressive 
contribution of the feminist movement to the development of international criminal law 
during the last decade testifies to the transformative potential of the adaptation of positive 
law to meet women's concerns. 
Bruno Simma & Andreas S. Paulus, The Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights 
Abuses in Internal Conflicts: A Positivist View, 93 AM. J. lNT'LL. 302, 306 (1999). 
4. And confessedly so: 
[I]t would be disingenuous to claim that the instant work (or any work of legal interpreta­
tion) is a neutral rendering. Wherever possible, it reads the source materials as coherent 
rather than chaotic, and it presents established legal doctrines, especially those emphasizing 
non-intervention in the internal affairs of states, in a light that suggests that they are not, as 
some have maintained, altogether lacking in moral vision. It is, in a sense, inherently a con­
servative project The account of norms of international conduct developed in an ideologi­
cally plural environment is unquestionably colored by the author's concern to preserve space 
in the world for ideological pluralism and innovation. 
P. 34 (footnote omitted). 
5. See Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law - A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 
HARV. L. REV. 630, 644-48 (1958). 
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(such as the self-determination of Third-World peoples) that they 
would not otherwise be inclined to undertake. 6 That legal scholarship 
impress those who are not natural political allies is the test, not only of 
its scholarly merit, but also of its political merit; that friends may be 
disappointed is of far lesser significance. 
This task is not to everyone's taste, and some in the academy have 
devoted their considerable talents to discrediting the project of legal 
reasoning, as conventionally understood.7 But their efforts, though 
often of great intellectual sophistication, are profoundly misguided. In 
their zeal to "unmask" law's legitimation of exercises of power, they 
fail to appreciate that law can legitimate such exercises only insofar as 
it simultaneously constrains them. Power holders seeking the impri­
matur of legality can benefit only to the extent that they accept its 
limits, for violation of the limits necessarily reverses the process of le­
gitimation.8 
To deny such a relationship between legitimation and constraint is 
to assert that putative legal limits are a remarkably effective ruse -
that legal rhetoric, rather improbably, fools most of the people all of 
the time. (Presumably, the power holders are not thought to be fool­
ing themselves, since if the constraints, though objectively illusory, 
seem real enough to them, the rule of law would be a reality in politi­
cal terms even if a chimera in philosophical terms.) On the other 
6. Thus, according to Ronald Dworkin: 
A naturalist judge might find, in some principle that has not yet been recognized in judicial 
argument, a brilliantly unifying account of past decisions that shows them in a better light 
than ever before .... Nevertheless the constraint, that the judge must continue the past and 
not invent a better past, will often have the consequence that a naturalist judge cannot reach 
decisions that he would otherwise, given his own political theory, want to reach. 
Ronald A. Dworkin, "Natural" Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 165, 169 {1982). 
7. Martti Koskenniemi characteristically notes that in his experience in international 
legal practice, 
competent lawyers routinely drew contradictory conclusions from the same norms, or found 
contradictory norms embedded in one and the same text or behavior .... As I learned from 
David Kennedy, the legal argument inexorably, and quite predictably, allowed the defense 
of whatever position while simultaneously being constrained by a rigorously formal lan­
guage. 
Martti Koskenniemi, Letter to the Editors of the Symposium, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 351, 354-55 
(1999). , 
There are many grounds, however, for questioning the cynical lessons that Koskenniemi 
and Kennedy draw from such observations. Most straightforward among them is that the 
project of legal argumentation would not likely consume the time and attention of intelli­
gent, well-informed, and savvy individuals if it were so barren of substance. 
8. I have made this point more elaborately in Brad R. Roth, What Ever Happened to 
Sovereignty? Reflections on International Law Methodology, in TOWARD UNDERSTANDING 
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
TOOLBOX 69, 77-83 (Charlotte Ku & Thomas G. Weiss eds., 1998). 
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hand, if law does constrain as well as legitimate the exercise of power, 
to neglect that point is to miss an important political opportunity.9 
Thus, Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law, in develop­
ing legal grounds for limiting the intervention of foreign powers in the 
internal affairs of weak states, is highly conventional in its method, ex­
cept in one important respect. Because there has only recently come 
into being an international law of the internal character of domestic 
political systems, there is no tradition in international law scholarship 
of interpreting the relevant practices and pronouncements of states in 
light of the diversity of political principles and power arrangements 
that have been efficacious in the international community. The task of 
legal interpretation in this area implicates the fields of political theory 
and comparative politics; without an understanding of the political 
ideals and structures that have had a voice and a vote in the interna­
tional system, one tends to read the source material in light of highly 
parochial assumptions about political life. Thus, Chapters Two, 
Three, and Four, as interdisciplinary aids to legal interpretation, dis­
tinguish the book from more standard international law scholarship. 
For this limited interpretive purpose, however, one need under­
stand only empowered approaches to political legitimacy - that is to 
say, approaches that have been influential among state actors (West­
ern, Socialist, and Nonaligned) whose deeds and words are the source 
material of international law in the relevant periods. That other, dis­
empowered approaches may more authentically represent cultural 
norms in much of the world (e.g., in postcolonial states ruled by un­
representative, Western-influenced leaders) would be interesting to 
know, but unhelpful to this particular project. 
The book does not purport to be a thoroughgoing examination of 
the question of political legitimacy ·in general; that would be a project 
so immense as to be imponderable. Rather, the book seeks to be a 
thoroughgoing examination of the international norm emerging to 
govern the exceptional case: the de facto government so manifestly 
unrepresentative as to be arguably without standing to resist, in the 
name of the sovereignty belonging to the underlying political commu­
nity, external impositions. 
The question, then, is what indication of representativeness is 
minimally required to deem a ruling apparatus the state's "govern­
ment" for purposes of international law. The orthodox approach to 
this question has been the "effective control doctrine," the linchpin of 
9. Even Koskenniemi seems recently to have endorsed this proposition. See Martti 
Koskenniemi, Carl Schmitt, Hans Morgenthau, and the Image of Law in International Rela­
tions, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLmCS: EsSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 17, 32 & n.96 (Michael Byers ed., 2000) ("[D]oing 
away with [the question of legal 'validity'] has definite social consequences. Not least of 
these is the liberation of the executive from whatever constraints (valid) legal rules might 
exert over them [sic]."). 
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which is popular acquiescence in governance (pp. 137-42). A sharp 
break from orthodoxy is implicit in liberal-internationalist assertions 
of a "democratic entitlement," the linchpin of which is a liberal­
democratic institutional structure.10 The former approach is clearly 
giving way to a significant extent, and there are those who argue, on 
the basis of a fair amount of evidence, that the latter approach is 
emerging as the basis of a new norm that would open the door to 
"prodemocratic" intervention, perhaps including even the use of force, 
especially where a "freely and fairly elected" government has been 
overthrown.11 
Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law elaborately argues 
two politically relevant propositions: (1) that the case for the demo­
cratic entitlement as the emerging norm in international law is weaker 
than is generally supposed; and (2) that liberal-democratic legitimism 
(i.e., the use of the democratic entitlement as the basis for disregard­
ing a government's legal prerogatives) is dangerous both to self­
determination and to peace. The book presents the second proposi­
tion as relevant to the first, inasmuch as one may appropriately am­
plify those aspects of the source material that stem from enlightened 
considerations. 
The book thereby intends to strike a blow for anticolonialism. It 
denies the existence of, and opposes the establishment of, a broad­
ranging legal license for external intervention in the affairs of weak 
states. It associates such a license with great-power initiatives of the 
past that have been misguided at best, oppressive and exploitative at 
worst. Confronting a dismal subject matter that admits only of bleak 
choices, the book maintains a presumption in favor of what I, none too 
facetiously, often refer to as "the right to be ruled by one's own 
thugs," though it concedes a limited range of blatant thuggery that 
overcomes this presumption.12 
The book does not, as Gathii charges, "celebrate[] Haiti as the ex­
emplary contemporary case of successful prodemocracy interven­
tion,"13 but merely accepts that in a certain class of cases, of which 
Haiti is archetypical, one can no longer, and should not want to, deny 
the existence of an exception to the nonintervention norm. What 
10. The seminal works of the "democratic entitlement" school are: Gregory H. Fox, 
The Right to Political Participation in International Law, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 539 (1992); 
Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46 
(1992). 
11. For a wide-ranging compilation of scholarly approaches to the question of the 
democratic entitlement, see DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., forthcoming 2000). 
12. The book is not a political manifesto, however, and supporters of the democratic 
entitlement will hopefully find much within it to be of scholarly value, even while regarding 
its grounding for verdicts of governmental illegitimacy as far too limited. 
13. Gathii, supra note 2, at 2052. 
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Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law seeks to promote is a 
balanced norm, one that finds ample support in state practice and 
opinio juris and that serves, to the extent possible, the long-term inter­
ests of the inhabitants of weak states. 
II. CONFESSIONS OF A "NEOCONSERV ATIVE REALIST" 
Gathii's characterization of my work as an exemplar of "neo­
conservative realism" presents several difficulties. There are certain 
aspects of the book that can fairly be characterized as "conservative" 
and as "realist," at least in counterposition to liberal internationalism, 
if special definitions of those terms are designated with sufficient care. 
The book is conservative in the limited sense that it seeks to rational­
ize and to bolster the conception of international legal order, premised 
on the twin principles of self-determination of peoples and non­
intervention in internal affairs, that was dominant throughout the 
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, but that now faces significant challenges.14 
The book is realist to the extent that it takes states (qua political 
communities entitled to self-government) seriously as units of the in­
ternational system, and that it treats skeptically efforts to superimpose 
idealist blueprints on complex and unruly realities. 15 
Gathii's own efforts to define the terms, however, lead only to con­
fusion. The prefix "neo-" is especially troubling, because although 
Gathii at times seems to intend it in a more generic sense, the term 
"neoconservative" cannot be disassociated from a specific movement 
among right-wing American intellectuals that stands for propositions 
diametrically opposed to the book's central arguments. It is jarring to 
see the word used to characterize, for example, a discussion of U.S. in­
tervention in Central America so overtly adverse to that emblematic 
neoconservative project of the 1980s (pp. 290-303, 347-61). Indeed, 
Gathii's accurate assertion that "[t]he neoconservative tradition . . .  is 
embedded in American exports such as neoliberalism and democracy 
promotion programs"16 goes far in explaining the book's chilly recep-
14. Gathii seems not to notice that the American Right has been a consistent opponent 
of that conception. For a colorfully harsh illustration, see Jeane J. Kirkpatrick & Allan 
Gerson, The Reagan Doctrine, Human Rights, and International Law, in RIGHT v. MIGHT: 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 19 (Louis Henkin ed., 2d ed. 1991) (1989). 
15. Edward Hallett Carr, certainly not a man of the Right, was frequently characterized 
(not quite fairly) as a realist for holding such views. See generally EDWARD HALLETI 
CARR, THE T\VENTY YEARS CRISIS, 1919-39: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1939); CHARI.ES JONES, E.H. CARR AND INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS: A DUTY TO LIE (1998). 
16. Gathii, supra note 2, at 2002. Of course, the very fact that liberalism and conserva­
tism are not necessarily antonyms suggests the urgent need for care in defining terms. Neo­
conservatism represents the right wing of liberal internationalism, the left wing of which is 
represented by the human rights activist co=unity. Embedded in my book is the judgment 
that human rights activists are making a mistake in embracing legal frameworks, such as the 
democratic entitlement, that will end up best serving the neoconservative agenda. 
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tion of the latter; but how, then, can the book conceivably be identi­
fied with neoconservatism? This glitch could be dismissed as a detail 
if it were not reflective of Gathii's broader misperception of the politi­
cal spectrum. 
Gathii complains of "binary thinking" as a " 'pathological' feature 
of Western knowledge systems,"17 but ironically, it is his organization 
of the material, not mine, that suffers from this pathology. Thus, 
Gathii does not discern that my approach to the question of govern­
mental illegitimacy charts a middle way between the effective control 
doctrine and the democratic entitlement, one that seeks to appreciate 
the vast diversity of legitimacy rationales without embracing an abject 
relativism. To the extent that the book seeks to categorize the ele­
ments of that diversity, it does so expressly for the sake of convenience 
alone, and in a tone of self-deprecation.18 For all of his complaints 
about my neglect of non-Western approaches to legitimacy, Gathii 
nowhere explains how the book excludes that which it does not ex­
pressly discuss. Nonetheless, this either-or motif is the relentless 
theme of his essay. 
According to Gathii's dichotomous reasoning, "Western" ap­
proaches to international relations amount to a dyad of liberal interna­
tionalist and neoconservative realist tendencies. Thus, the idea of 
"liberalism overextending itself' - which well captures my adverse 
characterization of the effort to exalt liberal-democratic institutional 
norms as legal criteria for governmental legitimacy - is, for Gathii, 
necessarily of a piece with Right-of-Center critiques of the New Deal 
welfare state.19 Yet the considerations that underlie my critique of lib­
eral internationalism cannot, on any careful reading, be imagined to 
emanate from the Right. 
Gathii's reasoning turns on an assertion that my "examination of 
only the legitimacy or illegitimacy of state authority invariably en­
dorses the inequalities inherent in the private order which overlays the 
authority of any government providing its public imprimatur in private 
ordering."20 But given that my project concerned a very narrow (al-
17. Id. at 2005 n. 21. 
18. For example: 
Such legitimating visions are many and varied. A comprehensive listing and explication 
would consume many volumes, and would perhaps never be complete. These visions can, 
however, usefully be classified according to their relationship to the familiar (if frequently 
misunderstood) concepts of liberalism and democracy, the fusion of which is now fashiona­
bly proclaimed to offer a final resolution of the question of governmental legitimacy. 
P. 70. It is only to this extent that, "[t]o put it glibly, the international community contains 
liberal democrats, non-liberal democrats, liberal non-democrats, and non-liberal non­
democrats . . . .  " Pp. 39-40 (emphasis added), quoted in Gathii, supra note 2, at 2005 n. 21 
{adding different emphasis). 
19. See Gathii, supra note 2, at 200 2 n.14. 
20. Id. at 2003. 
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beit grandly complex) question - namely, when does a ruling appara­
tus in effective control lack standing to assert rights, incur obligations, 
and authorize acts on behalf of the state in the international system? 
- Gathii's assertion seems merely to reflect a methodological preju­
dice against treating anything as a discrete issue.21 For Gathii, either 
one expressly discusses economic and social inequality in every con­
text, or one is unconcerned with it. 
Ironically, part of the book's criticism of the democratic entitle­
ment thesis is precisely that the latter emphasizes institutional criteria 
at the expense of contextual factors such as economic and social condi­
tions (pp. 104-06, 120, 424-26) - an aspect that would, I had supposed, 
be hard to miss if one were reading the book for its political implica­
tions. The book's defense of sovereign prerogative overtly reflects an 
interest in maintaining political space for the very resistance to pri­
vate-sector predation that Gathii seeks to champion.22 Moreover, 
Gathii's complaint that I "ignore" international economic domina­
tion23 could not be more misplaced, since I not only discuss the various 
pronouncements of intergovernmental organizations against coercive 
economic measures, but seek to establish for those pronouncements a 
legal significance that, though modest, goes beyond what most West­
ern international lawyers tend to admit.24 
To make use of legal discourse, however, is to accept that its politi­
cal worth - its credibility with influential actors who do not share 
one's interests and values - can be maintained only by resisting the 
temptation to assert as law one's entire political and moral wish list. I 
do not contend that the lending conditions imposed by international 
financial institutions are violations of international law, as Gathii 
21. Gathii's predisposition is particularly distortive in his treatment of the "state neces­
sity" /"implied mandate" doctrine. See id. at 2009 (citing pp. 155-59). That doctrine legally 
ascribes to a state the uncontroversial public acts and obligations undertaken by a de facto 
government notwithstanding that government's illegitimacy - postal and aeronautical con­
ventions being my posited examples. For Gathii, these examples reproduce the "pub­
lic/private distinction,'' and my approving invocation of them supposedly demonstrates that I 
have "almost blind faith in the idea that . . .  the exclusivity of the private sphere from public 
power guarantees neutrality and therefore freedom." Gathii, supra note 2, at 2025, 2026. 
Such unjustified leaps highlight the dangers of metaphorical reasoning. 
22. Compare pp. 424-26, with Gathii, supra note 2, at 2052. Since Gathii dismisses sov­
ereign prerogative and private property as deriving from one and the same Eurocentrism, he 
inadvertently debilitates his own cause. 
23. See Gathii, supra note 2, at 2027. 
24. I suggest, albeit rather tepidly, that secondary boycotts and other extraterritorial 
pressures, even when adopted purportedly in response to a state's human rights violations, 
amount to unlawful coercion absent authorization by the United Nations Security Council 
under Article 41 of the Charter {pp. 167-71). The more standard view is to the contrary. 
See, e.g., Lori Fisler Damrosch, Politics Across Borders: Nonintervention and Nonforcible 
Influence over Domestic Affairs, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 46 {1989) (treating economic coercion 
as a nonissue, at least where human rights are at stake). 
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would like,25 because the absence of any broadly accepted basis would 
render the contention useless and self-discrediting. Furthermore, I do 
not denounce the absence of a doctrinal basis for this contention as a 
failing of international law, because that body of law has never pre­
tended to exhaust the question of international distributive justice. 
Like many "critical" theorists, Gathii, in so busily demonstrating the 
truism that law is political, fails to appreciate the distinctiveness of 
law's role in politics, and therefore curses its necessary limitations. 
The supreme example of Gathii's binary thinking, however, and by 
far the most disturbing, is the neat division between "Eurocentric" and 
"Third-World" approaches. The irony of Gathii's condemnation of 
my "Eurocentrism" (apart from the difficulty of reconciling it with my 
copious quotations from Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Raul 
Castro, and the like) is that the reconstructed image of the 
contemporary sovereign state system that I present reflects the 
influences, direct and indirect, of the Nonaligned Bloc, quite as much 
as it does those of Westphalia or even of the drafters of the United 
Nations Charter. As the book details, the era of decolonization and its 
aftermath profoundly affected legal norms, as both Western and 
Socialist blocs purchased Third-World political support by, inter alia, 
affirming the inviolability of weak states (pp. 6, 113-18, 160-71). In 
repudiating conventional legal analysis as Eurocentric, Gathii 
dismisses both the significance of Third-World participation in shaping 
contemporary norms and the extent of the Third World's stake in the 
continued vitality of those norms - an attitude not, so far as I can tell, 
broadly shared among Third-World leaders, scholars, or peoples. 
International law's basic categories do, of course, stem from 
European sources,26 but then so, too, in large measure, do the 
ideologies of the postcolonial state governments. Gathii may see this 
as itself a corruption of authentic African, Asian, and Latin-American 
traditions,27 but the struggle over authenticity is internal to those 
25. See Gathii, supra note 2, at 2026-39. 
26. Gathii's harshest complaint here is with the idea of the state itself as a doctrinal en­
tity abstracted from the idea of the nation. See id. at 2041-48. But one looks in vain for an 
indication of what solution a reintroduction of the idea of the nation (which I consider to be, 
in terms of both legal doctrine and normative political theory, a good riddance) presents for 
the problems of postcolonial countries. Surely he is not suggesting disaggregating African 
political units and reconfiguring them in some more traditionally coherent way, since this 
could be accomplished, if at all, only through extraordinary violence. 
Indeed, it is difficult to perceive how Gathii defines "nation" and "nationalism." Insofar 
as he means the "nationalism" represented by the anticolonial and antiimperialist struggles 
that he references, he is mistaken to regard my book's characterization of legal doctrine in 
the area of self-determination of peoples as anything less than a monument to those strug­
gles. 
27. Illustrative is his approving citation of Ngugi Wa Thiong'o's characterization of "the 
English language in former British colonies in Africa [as] a 'cultural time bomb' that contin· 
ues a process of erasing memories of pre-colonial cultures and history as a way of installing 
the dominance of new, more insidious forms of colonialism." Id. at2020. 
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societies and cultures. If Gathii is intent on regarding Third-World 
authenticity as excluding Western political thought - Rousseau and 
Marx as much as Locke and Mill, and by extension all African, Asian, 
and Latin-American thinkers who have drawn inspiration from them 
- his notion of "Third-World approaches" cannot help but be a 
highly tendentious rendering. 
Gathii is correct to assert that my analysis treats colonialism as a 
legal aberration rather than as "ingrained in international law as we 
know it today."28 But he fails altogether to explain why it would be 
useful, in terms of his purported political goals, to do otherwise. 
Characterizing contemporary international law as essentially continu­
ous with patterns of past Western domination (thereby belittling the 
hard-won achievements of anticolonialist struggles) scarcely promises 
a more effective defense to the phenomena - economic disem­
powerment, cultural imperialism, and proposals to subject "failed 
states" to trusteeship29 - against which he inveighs. Gathii undoubt­
edly believes that Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law, in 
failing to attack the structure of international law itself, subtly re­
inforces these phenomena. But the first two exist despite, not because 
of, the conception of international law that the book embodies, and 
the last is most effectively opposed by invoking that conception. 
CONCLUSION 
Professor Gathii's substantive concerns about neocolonialism and 
neoliberalism are the very concerns that underlie Governmental Ille­
gitimacy in International Law. It is thus ironic - though, in light of 
recent scholarly trends, not very surprising - that he should regard 
my book as part of the problem rather than as part of the solution. It 
would be different if the methodological radicalism of Gathii and oth­
ers of his persuasion entailed a programmatic alternative. But it does 
not. Instead, it disdains to engage in the only consequential struggle in 
which its adherents are, by training and position, equipped to partici­
pate. It therefore reflects neither the interests nor, it is a sure bet, the 
views of those on whose behalf it purports to operate. Faced with the 
alternative that it presents to more traditional modes of scholarship, I 
much prefer to take the advice of an old mentor: "the more radical 
the message, the more conservative the suit." 
28. Id. at 2020. 
29. Id. at 2021. 
